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Abstract: Conflict prevail when there is the absence of peace. African countries probably get the worst 
representation globally with the exception of Syria when it comes to conflicts and violence in the continent. 
Seemingly, every story emanating from the continent project one atrocity or another. Despite the shouldering 
of the larger share of the world’s conflict, Africa has relatively become more peaceful as well, however in 
Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgence in the north is another epicentre. This paper centres on the intervention 
besides collaborative determination of ECOWAS – AU in mediating peace, and the peacebuilding mechanisms 
in resolving states conflicts, and to strengthen democracy in West Africa, with the case of Côte d’Ivoire. The 
organizations’ efforts in the Ivorian case reflect discourses and the dynamics of the operations of an effective 
regional organization, and the international community in addressing conflicts. The collaborative theory was 
embraced to put things inappropriate perception. Findings show that the implementation of the Contrivance 
and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance by ECOWAS were better prepared to meet challenges 
related to peace and security in the region. This paper concludes and recommends that organisations who 
mediate peace in any conflict zone must first understand the cause of the conflict, thereafter timely intervene, 
and take common positions in applying different mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. It is 
recommended that to prevent violence and human rights abuses in crisis situations, the organisations of 
ECOWAS and AU, and particularly SADC should improve interventions procedure. 
 
Keywords: Democratic regional organizations; conflict prevention; peace-making; peace-building, and security 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Conflict prevail when there is the absence of peace, it is a staid deviation and argument that arise between two 
or more people on something of interest, and may lead to violence. Conflict is regarded as threats to peace and 
security. Apparently, every story emanating from the continent of Africa seems to project one violence or 
another. Debatably, African has experienced about half of the world’s conflicts, despite being 16% of the world 
population. Amazingly this is a slightly larger share of the world’s conflicts than in the 1990s chaotic years of 
post-cold wars. Nevertheless, there are two main important caveats, the absolute number of conflicts in the 
world has experienced has considerably decreased in the last two decades. Despite the shouldering of the larger 
share of the world’s conflict encumbrance, Africa has relatively become more peaceful as well (Dorrie, 2016). 
A continent of 55 nation-states, conflicts only cluster in a few specific regions. According to the Uppsala 
Conflicts Data program in 2014, only about 12 African nations experienced what is categorized as armed 
conflicts, but in 2015 countries like Burundi, Niger and Chad made it to the list. Geographically, Africa’s conflicts 
are tightly clustered along an arc stretching from northern Mali through southern Algeria, Libya into Egypt, 
extending into the Sinai Peninsula (Dorrie, 2016). 
 
In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency ravaging in the northern part of the country is another epicentre -
interestingly it is considered the deadliest conflicts on the continent of Africa which cannot be categorized as 
terrorist conflict, though it is gradually spreading into other African neighbouring states (Dorrie, 2016). It is 
positioned in relative proximity to an area of a hot spot in the centre African Republic, the eastern DRC, South 
Sudan, Darfur and Burundi, regions. On the eastern coast of Africa, we have Somali civil war which is currently 
ongoing strong after three decades. Basically all African modern conflicts are thus exceedingly confined and 
interestingly they flout unsophisticated elucidations based on stereotypes (Curtis, 2012). Therefore, there is 
the need for the institution of the Economic Community of West Africa States(ECOWAS) to collaborate with 
African Union (AU) to devise a strategy to intervene and resolve the various conflicts within its region. In 2002 
the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) transition to African Union(AU), adopted several mechanisms and 
protocols defined AU’s position and role in peacekeeping and peace-making, as well as its commitments to 
strengthen democracy and good governance in Africa. This marked shift policies and practices of the then OAU. 
It is principally because the OAU Charter highlighted commitments by members to maintain peace and security 
on the continent, the principle to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and its non-
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interventionist stance during periods of conflict in several African countries elicited concerns over the 
relevance of the OAU in upholding and stimulating peace and security within the region.  
 
The failure of the OAU to intervene decisively in the Rwandan genocide and conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), revealed its inability or unwillingness to take action 
to resolve conflicts even if gross violations of human rights and atrocities were committed. The Constitutive 
Act of the AU in 2002 rejects unconstitutional changes of government and the new organisation of AU 
developed mechanisms and protocols to promote democracy and good governance. The African Union 
established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004, with its provision to recommend that the Assembly 
of heads of state for the Union to intervene in states experiencing crimes against humanity, this highlights a 
major change in way conflict resolution is viewed under the African Union (Kode, 2016). The principle of 
rejecting unconstitutional changes of government has been significantly strengthened and given legal backing 
by the AU organisation, and in practice the AU organisation has intervened in countries where changes in 
government have been unconstitutional, and where peace and security have been threatened. In the case of 
ECOWAS, its intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts, and the need to strengthen its peace and 
security mechanisms necessitated the advance of the Protocol involving the Instrument or Mechanism for the 
Prevention of Conflict, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security (1999), the Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance (2001) (Kibasomba, 2002). These protocols were aimed at enabling a better-coordinated 
retort to conflict and crises in the region. 
 
The AU organisation alongside the ECOWAS intervention role played in the Ivorian crisis is a good example that 
increasingly came under analysis. Then again, the peace-production and peacekeeping endeavors of these 
associations were applauded for averting further barbarities. Their efforts to restore peace were not often 
respected by various parties involved in the conflict, being criticised in some quarters. Côte d’Ivoire became a 
test case for rapid interventions by regional actors at a time when the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and 
ECOWAS experienced what is called transitional changes in order to upgrade so as to meet what it requires to 
ensure peace and security  in Africa in the 21st century (David, 2016).  The specific obligations, structure, 
economic capability and the degree of sustainability of regional determinations to ensure that conflicts are 
resolved, principally with regards to peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building came under 
questioning. Discussions additionally centred around the near preferred standpoint of provincial and UN-
authorized mediations, the inability to react to violations against humankind and destruction in Rwanda, the 
manageability of African-led peacekeeping activities and the criticalness in the operationalization of some UN-
led tasks. The mediations of AU in Burundi in 2003 and Somalia in 2007, the ECOWAS drove activity in Liberia 
in 1990, and Sierra Leone in 1997, expanded desires concerning the crucial part of African-drove peacekeeping 
missions (Shillinger, 2009). This study basically presents the peace-keeping role of the ECOWAS, the AU and 
the international community in the resolution of conflicts through collaborative efforts, and highlights the 
dynamics involved in the takeover of regional peacekeeping missions by UN operations.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A Cursory Review on African States’ Conflicts and Insurgencies: In Nigeria, the frequent reports on Boko 
Haram throughout 2015 came with hopes. Though the uprising is said to be one of the deadliest conflicts that 
Africa has now firmly spread into other neighbouring states as well, it has recorded the lowest levels of deaths 
according to report as predicted in 2015 forecast (Dorrie, 2016). The president of Nigeria Mohammad Buhari 
finalized some specific modification son how conflicts are managed, these seem to be paying off on the long run 
as the Nigerian military continue to record victory over the sets group (Boko Haram which literally means 
‘western education is evil’). The current military successes in combatting the set groups labelled as the Boko 
Haram are depended on spending billions on modern military gear that none of the neighbouring countries 
involved can actually afford, riding all of them into serious debt. France and the United States provide Nigeria 
with critical assistance, both in terms of intelligence and combatting other terrorist groups farther north, so 
that Nigeria’s army can therefore focus on the Boko Haram threat. This goes without saying that it is not terribly 
sustainable. Nevertheless, it is argued that the Boko Haram insurgency has continued to be a substantial source 
of violence in both in Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria, though not on the extremist level as experienced in 
2014 and early 2015 which marked the peak of the violence (Dorrie, 2016). 
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In African today, the Mali-Algeria-Libya triangular conflicts are regarded as the international terrorist hot spot. 
There are several conflicting groups which include the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the most active group 
across some of the most arbitrary borders in the world, these conflicts are interrelated. Their firmness will still 
require primarily national approaches (Peter, 2016). According to Dorrie (2016), Mali is only currently held 
unruffled by the existence of the international troops and donors it receives, while still becoming more insecure 
even in the country’s south. It is quite unfortunate that the corrupt and inept political elite obviously has 
learned nothing from the near collapse experienced in the year 2012, and there is only little hope that it will do 
so miraculously in the near future years ahead. As the global community is too capitalised to let Mali crash, 
however the people will nevertheless witness what is called widespread insecurity and belligerent in the 
northern part of the state, while on the other hand the south will experience more terrorist spasms targeted to 
the government, with it establishments linked with West. In Algeria however, there is indeed a fascinating 
circumstance, the political administrations are so elite-driven, securely entwined with the security institution, 
that they are fundamentally impassable from the external.  
 
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika amalgamated supremacy over the last few years, but unfortunately he is an old 
man with a dyed-in-the-wool history of serious illness. Algeria’s internal power balance is heavily grounded or 
built on using funds spawned by the state’s rich benefaction with hydrocarbons to buy modern and innovative 
kits for its bloated military apparatus, thus charge officers and recruited men happy, in order to suppress public 
disgruntlement. The oil prices in a slump and internal conflicts over Bouteflika’s succession, the worst-case 
scenario would see anger over low living standards and lack of opportunity boil over, mix with elite 
factionalism. In the Central Africa Republic up to 2013, the conflicts in the Central Africa Republic (CAR), and 
South Sudan linger to flame off over the period of 2016 till present. These states have gotten to delicate post-
conflict concessions in the form of a political election in the CAR and the administration of the national unity in 
South Sudan. It is imperative to note that in both nations, the central government had a very limited power or 
authority even before the civil wars besmirched their capabilities to basically nothing to write home about. It 
is therefore predicted that there will continue to exist low-level violence as well, with flare-ups likely in case 
the UN peacekeeping operation with MONUSCO decides to bring the hammer down on some of these groups.  
 
According to Dorrie (2016), there were some scandals involving UN peace-keepers sexually abusing children 
in 2015 (Dorrie, 2016). In Somali, the catastrophes of Somalia continue to be in Darfur in Sudan, Darfur is 
proficient in an uptick in belligerent lately and there is no motive, certainly not the non-exiting international 
attention. And of course in Burundi, much was set to be contingent on the pronouncements of the African Union, 
with nearly every probable form of interference apprehensive with hesitations. A very noteworthy 
development would be the distribution of military dynamism against the will of the organisation under section 
4(h) of the union’s constitutive act (Curtis, 2012). According to a World Bank report, it warns that South Africa 
is another country to watch out for with her current attacks on foreign nationals by its citizens. South Africa 
remains the second largest economy after Nigeria in the south of the Sahara, and will absolutely not 
decentralize into large-scale core clash, there are few perturbing signs of progress however, the country’s 
economy had recently fallen into junk status, and it keeps going dejected the ditch, former President Jacob 
Zuma of South Africa appeared to be more incompetent or rather inept by the day while racial tension continues 
to run high in the country over a decade after end of apartheid. It is on record that South Africa remains the 
highest level of inequality in the world according to World Bank (2016) report, more than two decades after 
apartheid.  
 
There continue to be communal turmoil with considerable loss of life in 2015 and 2016, along with the line of 
the Marikana killings in 2016, the systematic prevalent of xenophobia and intolerance in the country, which 
may likely see the South African people turning contrary to each other as an alternative of the current state. 
However, the conflict that surrounded Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 divided the whole country for eight years, with its 
south part run by the Government and the north part controlled by the rebel forces. The violence and divisions 
in the country caused the reversal of major economic returns that had been gained since independence, and 
the political uncertainties threatened regional stability. While Côte d’Ivoire’s economy blossomed after 
independence, acknowledgements in part to readily available labour from nationals who had migrated from 
neighbouring countries in West Africa, signs of political tensions became apparent in the 1990s and culminated 
with a coup d’état in 1999, a disputed election in 2000 and an attempted coup in 2002 (Dorrie, 2016). Between 
2002 and 2010, Côte d’Ivoire experienced ethnic-related tensions, with the rebels running a parallel 
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government. Elections were postponed repeatedly despite diplomatic interventions by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The African Union (AU) and France, and military intervention 
by the United Nations. Even after elections were finally held in 2010, disputes around the electoral results led 
to violence and human rights violations and brought the country to the brink of another brutal civil war. The 
difficulties faced by the belligerents in agreeing on a way forward at the different stages of the conflict meant 
regional actors and the international community had to step in on a regular basis to prevent further escalations 
of violence during periods of relative peace (Dorrie, 2016). 
 
3. Material and Method 
 
A documentary analysis or method was adopted in this study as it helps to enlighten researchers and thereby 
make sense of written documents, which exist either in the unrestricted or private purview (Mogalakwe, 2006). 
This suggests that researchers can select the relevance of the documents they access on the basis of their 
applicability to the study. In that same vein another researcher argued that “in the documentary analysis, the 
criteria for selecting documents, or for focusing on particular extracts, should reflect the issues on which 
evidence is pursued” (Dey, 2005: 105). This study adopts the collaborative theory or approaches to resolving 
conflict in order to put things inappropriate perception. 
 
Theory: Collaborative Theory to Conflict Intervention: The collaborative theory to resolving conflict 
basically provides an introduction to a variety of conflict management techniques, incorporating a combination 
of theory and practice, and geared towards a broad audience (Isenhart and Spangle, 2000).  In collaborating 
method, it strives to ensure that two aggrieved sides are satisfied. It requires an open discourse of the 
considerable number of issues and concerns, investigation of elective arrangements, genuineness and 
responsibility from every one of the group. To be fruitful, the collaborating method of intervention members 
should have the capacity to surface worries in a non-undermining way and think inventively. It is imperative 
to first comprehend the distinction between a bargaining method and a teaming up style: bargaining is 'horse-
exchanging', surrendering things you need in the expectations that the opposite side will do likewise and that 
you can live with the result. In a coordinated effort, the two sides are endeavouring to find an answer which 
genuinely fulfils the necessities of each (Isenhart and Spangle, 2000). The teaming up style is a fantastic method 
to combine bits of knowledge from individuals with alternate points of view on an issue, and the outcome can 
be a solid responsibility for the arrangement from each side. The drawback of the teaming up style is that it is 
difficult to do! It requires close consideration regarding the current issues (concerns, not simply positions) and 
to the enthusiastic condition of the opposite side. 
 
4. The Interventions Mechanism in Conflict Situations in Africa 
 
In the 1990s the implementation of majority rule system reforms or changes and organized multiparty system 
election was implemented by most African nations, which flagged a move far from one-party governmental 
issues and the multiplication of military administrations that had described Africa's nation in the prompt post-
autonomy period. There was a chance for common society and autonomous media to beware of government 
abundances and consider public authorities to be responsible and accountable for their stewardship as they 
exercise the people's mandate. In this light elections turned into a normal component in African governmental 
issues and a few nations corrected their constitutions by including arrangements to regard the control of law 
and advance great administration (Dorrie, 2016). This implied a new beginning for most African nations, 
particularly when contrasted with the quick post-freedom period, when administering parties caught control 
and forced serious limitations on the political restriction and common society. Nonetheless, this period likewise 
saw frightful and crushing clashes in nations like Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and 
Sudan. While each one of these contentions was intra-express, all had genuine ramifications for their separate 
locales, and some really spread past national outskirts. While belligerents battled and conferred net 
infringement of human rights—murdering, lynching and snatching civilians —there was a call to mediate and 
put an end to these abominations by the international community (Swart and Solomon, 2004). 
 
According to Klingebiel (2005), there were instances, where several questions were raised about the inability 
or the reluctance of the international community to put an end to the atrocities with the abuse of human rights 
in some of these conflict states particularly the African organisations. At the end of the Cold War, there have 
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been banters about the parts and duties, the planning and the yearnings of the international community -
especially, the UN, previous pioneer powers and regional actors, in interceding in strife influenced territories. 
In putting forth a defense for outsider mediations in conflicts circumstances, Zartman (2005:1) contends that 
foreign performers can't 'take cover behind the dread of their own losses or of long-haul association as a reason 
for inaction'. The test for an international organisation in interceding in clashes lies in quickly assembling 
suitable powers to uphold peace and consolidating such military activities with discretionary arrangements 
between warring groups.  
 
In situations where clashes eject and there is a gross infringement of human rights and barbarities conferred 
by those associated with the contention, there have been worries about the timeframe it takes to approve and 
set up together peacekeeping powers and send them to the warring states to keep up the peace and secure 
existences of the general population. Regardless of the solid case for why international community ought to 
mediate in specific clashes, Mays (2002) advises us that 'the authorizing of peacekeeping activities and 
intercessions in clashes or the growing of continuous tasks relies upon the endorsement of all UN Security 
Council individuals'. Furthermore, there are worries that the perpetual individuals from the Security Council 
have settled on choices about where and when to intercede depending, not on the need to ensure people or 
authorize a peace understanding, however on the vital connections they have with nations influenced by 
struggle (Adebajo, 2011).  It can likewise be contended that the absence of firm activity by the Council in specific 
clashes radiates from the absence of specific financial, political or vital interests individual members from the 
Council have with nations in strife or their pre-occupation with different emergencies. The annihilation in 
Rwanda, for instance, and the withdrawal of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
exhibits the connection among countries and individuals from the Security Council and the desires of the last 
in mediating in specific clashes over others (May 2002). The way that most individuals from the Council did 
not have major vital interests in Rwanda at the time, especially in the post-Cold Wartime, the intersection of 
contentions that required the consideration of the global network amid that period and the encounters of the 
United States in Somalia prevented individuals from the Council from completely submitting. 
 
The Organisational Transformation from the OAU to AU (African Union): It has been noted on several 
occasions the United Nations Security Council has infrequently responded adequately to conflicts, and on time 
in Africa, even though most of the deliberations on peace and security matters concern African countries 
(Adebajo, 2011). There comes a noteworthy thought, if the international organisation as the United Nations 
(UN) neglected to intercede in specific clashes, what could territorial organisations like the AU do to avert mass 
monstrosities when clashes emitted in Africa? In the result of the Rwandan decimation and different clashes 
around Africa, the then OAU (the Organization of African Unity) was frequently reprimanded for neglecting to 
assume the liability to mediate in clashes, authorize peace and stop human rights infringement. While the OAU 
had an instrument to review strife and savagery, as the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, 
its endeavors to determine African clashes rather adopted a political strategy, underscoring the utilization of 
peacefulness and regard or respect for the sway and regional respectability of its member states (Foltz, 1991; 
Ajulu, 2004; Yound, 1991). In this respects, specially appointed boards of trustees were set up by the 
Commission additionally to address savagery and struggle, however as Deng contends, most African pioneers 
and leaders had framed agreeable partnerships with each other, and this implied, during strife, individuals 
from these councils were more keen on ensuring the security and assurance of their associates than settling 
the main problem of contentions. In spite of the foundation of the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration, the then OAU amid its reality favored non-obstruction in the inward undertakings of its states amid 
the contention, and was viewed as 'a quiet spectator to monstrosities submitted in various member states' 
(Gomes, 2008: 113– 30).  
 
Apparently, the leaders of African states met in Sirte, Libya in September 1999, to survey and review the OAU 
Charter in order increase the productivity level, boost efficiency and adequacy of the mainland alliance to 
address the difficulties witnessed by the continent. One of these difficulties was the scourge of contention and 
the consequences for the general population of Africa. The Sirte Declaration consequently required the end of 
contention and conflicts, keeping in mind the end goal to accomplish this and different targets, they chose to 
shape the new association known as the African Union (AU). This was trailed by the foundation of the AU in 
2002, the point of which was to advance peace, security and dependability, popularity based standards and 
organizations, standard cooperation and great administration, and to strengthen democracy in Africa 
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particularly. Aware of the exercises from the then OAU in the territory of peace and security, strife avoidance 
and goals, the new organisation is known as the AU therefore received a more interventionist approach through 
its systems, structures and foundations (Besada, Goetz and Werner, 2010; Khadiagala, 2012). Be that as it may, 
in 2004, the AU thought of another technique and built up its Peace Security Council (PSC) through the Protocol 
identifying with the Peace and Security Council (2002). The board made out of 15 individuals, the PSC was 
made to oversee and resolve strife and conflicts, which has a command to lead peace-production and peace-
keeping on the mainland of Africa. Article 7 (e) on the Protocol connecting to the foundation of the PSC engages 
the PSC to prescribe to the Assembly mediation for the benefit of the AU in nations experiencing atrocities, 
massacre and wrongdoings against mankind (AU, 2002).  
 
The way and manner that the OAU's instrument for strife and conflicts aversion, administration and goals 
(1993) was supplanted by the AU's PSC feature the adjustment in mentality and arrangements from non-
obstruction to non-impassion. Mwanasali (2008:41) states that this change from non-obstruction to non-lack 
of concern 'flags a noteworthy move in African political reasoning and foreshadows or shows the beginning of 
an interventionist stage in the African continent administration of peace and security'. This move in mentality 
was clear in the mediation of African-driven peacekeeping powers with a command from the AU in Burundi 
(2003– 04), Sudan (2004– 06), (Somalia 2007) and Central African Republic (2013). The mediations in these 
nations have created blended outcomes yet demonstrate a noteworthy move in the approach of the AU, despite 
the fact that the AU states unmistakably that it regards the privilege to power and regional trustworthiness of 
its individuals. In the instances of the Central African Republic and Sudan, the AU understood the material and 
money related expenses of peacekeeping missions and this exhibited the requirement for help from the 
universal network.  
 
Regardless of its adjustment in the state of mind to endeavors went for mediating in struggle circumstances to 
bring peace, and the blended victories following its intercessions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan, the AU 
has wound up in a circumstance much the same as that of its forerunner. This is especially valid on account of 
Burundi, which was dove into the struggle in April 2015 after a choice by President Pierre Nkurunziza to remain 
for a third term in office, which brought about resistance from political gatherings, common society and local 
nationals (David, 2016). The AU organisation voted not to send troops to Burundi regardless of the way that 
about 1,000 Burundians had been killed following a very long time of brutal dissents, an endeavored rebellion 
in May 2015, an undeniably critical compassionate circumstance and worries that Burundi could totally 
implode at the time the AU settled on its choice (Kode, 2016). In West Africa, the force and complexities of 
contentions in the 1990s—especially in Liberia (1989– 97 and 1999– 2003), Sierra Leone (1991– 2002) and 
Guinea-Bissau (1998– 99)— called for earnest intercessions to stop mass outrages, killings, demolition of 
property and state organizations, and the aggregate fall of society. The idea of the brutality had local 
ramifications with monstrous streams of displaced people crosswise over fringes which undermined the 
dependability of the district. The mediation of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone helped stop the killings and 
the wanton demolition of the property. Military mediation, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and later in Côte 
d'Ivoire, was gone before by, went with or took after conciliatory endeavors that prompted the consenting to 
of peace arrangements like the Cotonou, Abuja and Accra Peace Agreements on account of Liberia and the Lomé 
Agreement on account of Sierra Leone (Kode, 2016). 
 
The accomplishments made after intercessions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) constrained West 
African pioneers to take a gander at more organized and compelling approaches to drive local peacekeeping 
and peace-production endeavours. In such a manner, the various leaders of the local body consented to build 
up structures and instruments to encourage a more powerful and effective intends to intercede in future 
clashes and conflicts. ECOWAS set up an instrument for strife aversion and prevention, administration and 
goals, peacekeeping and security, in 1999 to control the association in counteracting, overseeing, settling 
interstate and intrastate clash and keep up peace and steadiness. The component had structures including the 
Council of Elders (Council of the Wise), the Mediation and Security Council and the Defence and Security 
Commission to address security issues (Kode, 2016). This component was additionally formed into the 
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. The Protocol was intended to fortify 
majority rules system of democracy in the locale with the thought that the nonappearance of genuine vote 
based systems and energetic organizations were at the focal point of contentions in the district. The 
formalization of a reserve drive called for under the 1999 Protocol would have suggestions for the continent 
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and for the AU's peacekeeping mission's endeavours. The choice by the AU's Peace and Security Council to build 
up an African Standby Force implies ECOWAS is the most developed in the formation of its provincial power. 
 
Peace Mediation and Collaborative Role of the ECOWAS and AU in Côte D’ivoire Conflict: The mechanism 
on Peace Mediation and the Collaborative effort of ECOWAS and AU adopted for the creation of an early-
warning system, the Council of the Wise and the special mediators on conflict and peace to pre-empt 
watersheds, was set up to react fittingly in nations influenced by strife and conflicts. It speaks to the most 
comprehensive structure for tending to dangers to peace and security in the locale, as it bolsters endeavours 
to pre-emptively address potential clash circumstances before they raise and gives ECOWAS duty to add to 
post-struggle improvement and reproduction (Zounmenou and Loua, 2011). This made exceptional delegates 
in struggle zones to liaise with local actors and the AU association. In 2001 ECOWAS grasped the Democracy 
and Good Governance Protocol (DGGP) keeping in mind the end goal to address a portion of the political clashes 
and administration disappointments that provoked clash in the locale. This convention built up the rules for 
the association for solid decisions, and along these lines approaches individuals to regard vote based standards 
and constitutions, and rejects illegal changes of government. Notwithstanding, in 1993 the ECOWAS Treaty was 
amended, giving supranational status on the organisation, to organize human security trying to reposition it to 
address the difficulties experienced by West African states toward the end of the Cold War. With the advantage 
of insight into the past and with encounters accumulated from its intercessions in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
clashes, ECOWAS member states understood the criticalness of; maintaining a strategic distance from 
postponements to activate troops from different parts of the world, having a decent comprehension of the 
geopolitics of the district: and, in this manner; received local way to deal with settle clashes (David, 2016). The 
local alliance embraced the Protocol Encompassing Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999 (Ekiyor, 2017). The Protocol on Non-animosity was embraced 
to deliver dangers identified with the interstate clash and approached ECOWAS individuals to cease from 
debilitating to utilize the power and abstain from overlooking threats against each other. The Protocol on 
Mutual Assistance on Defense was clear about the aggregate reaction of all individuals on security issues, as it 
noticed that dangers to one member influenced security in the whole locale. These conventions were likewise 
received in the quick post-autonomy period, strife and unlawful changes in government were being supported 
by neighboring nations.  
 
The intercession endeavors of the ECOWAS association in clashes within the area is in this manner upheld by 
the Mechanism and Protocol on Good Governance in accordance with arrangements on peace, security, the 
advancement of human rights and the insurance of nationals set up in the systems of the UN, the AU and the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development. ECOWAS perceives the centrality of teaming up with the AU and UN 
in fortifying peace and security in the entire region and in interceding in struggle circumstances. This joint 
effort is viewed as basic by ECOWAS pioneers and leaders and is commenced on lawful and moral 
commitments. As far as lawful commitments, it perceives the part of the UN in keeping up peace and security. 
It is one of eight authoritatively perceived local organisations in Africa and it teams up with the UN and AU in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The systems that guide ECOWAS's mediations in clashes and 
its commitments in post-struggle remaking which reflects enter standards in the Constitutive Act of the AU and 
the UN Charter and their rules on peace and security.  
 
The ethical commitments are driven by the obligation to secure (R2P - Responsibility to Protect), especially in 
acknowledgement of the repercussions of contention inside, viciousness and misuse executed against civilians 
and the inclination for interior clashes to rise above national limits. Besides, on 31 October 2010, without 
precedent for around 10 years and after a few delays, Ivorians finally went to the polls to vote. The elections 
were seen by delegates from the AU and ECOWAS notwithstanding others from universal associations and the 
European Union (EU). The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), On 4 November 2010, reported that 
Gbagbo had gotten 38.04% of the votes, against 32.07% for Ouattara and 25.24% for Henri Konan Bédié (HRW, 
2011). This required a run-off by the initial two hopefuls, in accordance with sacred arrangements.  
 
As per Afolabi (2012), the board and its intercession endeavors were eclipsed in a path by the 'varying interests 
and wanted political results of the individuals in accordance with their different advantages, the presence of an 
association with President Gbagbo, ideological introduction and the impact of France, Côte d'Ivoire's previous 
frontier ace. In the wake of debilitating all political and serene endeavours to determine the emergency, French 
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and UN powers helped the FN, which had promised dependability to Ouattara and was renamed the Republican 
Forces. A few exercises can be drawn from the mediation by the AU and ECOWAS in the Ivorian strife. The 
position taken by a few pioneers of the AU and ECOWAS to advance down and hand over power following the 
production of the aftereffects of the run-off decisions 2010 exhibited that African pioneers would now be able 
to reprimand the undemocratic inclinations of their associates, particularly when these companions lose 
elections and choose to hold tight to control. It was a positive message that the Democracy and Good 
Governance Protocol received by ECOWAS was by and large effectively connected in Côte d'Ivoire. 
Findings and Discussion: Just like in 2002, after the attempted coup, there was a quick response from regional 
actors. The argument is that the interventions mechanisms adopted did not demonstrate a satisfactory 
leadership in ECOWAS and the AU collaborative efforts in mediating peace and peace-building in the conflicting 
states, with the diplomatic engagements with the parties on the conflict. However, this mechanism did not 
create the right measures to ensure that actions made amid transactions and negotiations were completely 
authorized or actualized. Despite the fact that few ECOWAS pioneers had demanded that military move was to 
be made on the off chance that strategy flopped, however at last there were divisions among the leaders, they 
were not joined to the extent that this position becomes worried because of some close to home interests. 
Gbagbo had demanded amid the contention that the difficulties experienced by Côte d'Ivoire were caused by 
'settler powers' endeavouring to destabilize the nation. This view resounded with his supporters, especially 
the Young Patriots, who related to his approaches and convictions, regularly bolstered his activities, and had 
done assaults against French business interests. This view additionally charmed Mbeki to Gbagbo and he 
selected rather for an arranged arrangement between the warring groups. Moreover, there was an inclination 
among ECOWAS leaders that Mbeki was pushing for an arranged arrangement between President Gbagbo and 
Alassane Ouattara as opposed to embracing the position held by a few ECOWAS leaders that Gbagbo must 
surrender control. Indeed, even strategic endeavours were not extremely fruitful. Mbeki and Odinga, Peace 
envoys did not prevail with regards to convincing Gbagbo to surrender control as the brutality held on. This 
along these lines demonstrates the shortcomings in recognizing the correct people to lead strategic 
commitment by the association. The mediations by ECOWAS and the AU additionally featured divisions in 
approach positions at both local and mainland levels. Such divisions additionally helped Gbagbo in buying 
additional time and holding tight to control for longer, consequently delaying the viciousness and the 
monstrosities conferred. At the territorial level, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Sierra Leone were 
supportive of firm activities for driving Gbagbo to leave control and, if every strategic exertion flopped, likewise 
military activity. Others including Guinea, Liberia and to a specific degree Ghana, Togo and Benin did not take 
clear positions on the issue. The disappointment of the AU and ECOWAS to enough determination the 
emergency implied that obligation was given over to the UN and France. Without sufficiently tending to the 
subject of citizenship, it turned out to be progressively troublesome for recognizable proof procedures to be 
dealt with, which was the principle reason the elections were put off something like six times. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Conclusively, it was discussed in this paper that the conflict which engulfed Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 apparently 
divided the country for eight years. Due to violence and divisions in the country the major economic gains that 
had been made since independence were reversed, and the regional stability was threatened by political 
uncertainties. While Côte d’Ivoire’s economy blossomed after independence, acknowledgements in part to 
readily available labour from nationals who had migrated from neighbouring countries in West Africa, signs of 
political tensions became apparent in the 1990s and culminated with a coup d’état in 1999, a disputed election 
in 2000 and an attempted coup in 2002. 
 
It was also argued that the lack of action by the Council in certain conflicts emanates from the lack of particular 
economic, political or strategic interests of members of the Council with countries in conflict or their pre-
occupation with other crises. The genocide in Rwanda, for example, and the withdrawal of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was cited as a good example, which demonstrates the relationship 
between nations and members of the Security Council and the aspirations of the latter in intervening in certain 
conflicts over others. This paper has argued that the ECOWAS adoption of the Mechanism and the Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance, implied that its individuals were aware of what should be better arranged 
to address difficulties identified with peace and security in the sub-area. It likewise showed that ECOWAS 
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individuals trusted that peace and security were important for a majority rule government system to flourish. 
The instrument on Peace Mediation and the Collaborative exertion of ECOWAS and AU embraced for the 
making of an early-cautioning framework, the Council of the Wise and unique go-between to pre-empt 
watersheds, that was set up to react suitably in nations influenced by strife and conflicts was an appreciated 
improvement.  
 
It was viewed as the most comprehensive structure for tending to threats to peace and security in the district, 
as it underpins endeavours to pre-emptively address potential clash circumstances before they raise and gives 
ECOWAS obligation to add to post-struggle improvement and reproduction. At long last, the position taken by 
the pioneers of the AU and ECOWAS to venture down and hand over power following the production of the 
aftereffects of the run-off races 2010 showed that African pioneers would now be able to revile the 
undemocratic propensities of their grandees, particularly when they lose elections and choose to hold tight to 
control. It was also a positive message that the Democracy and Good Governance Protocol received by ECOWAS 
was by and large effectively connected in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2002, after the endeavoured upset, there was a brisk 
reaction from territorial actors. It was characterized that 'Contention win when there is the nonappearance of 
peace, since it is a staid deviation and contention resulted between at least two individuals that regularly 
prompt viciousness'. The struggle is viewed as dangers to peace and security. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Reject Unconstitutional Changes of Government: In the first phase of the civil war, the conflict and peace 
intervention strategy of ECOWAS and the AU is commendable. The matter of the fact that several leading 
African states including Nigeria and Ghana denounced the coup attempt against Gbagbo. It demonstrated that 
leaders of these African States adhered to key principles backed by protocols which rejected unconstitutional 
changes of government. This perhaps set a precedent as similar coups in Togo, Mali and Guinea Bissau were 
denounced by ECOWAS and the AU, with ECOWAS in particular imposing sanctions on these countries and 
suspending their membership.  
 
Peace Negotiation: Peace Talks should be encouraged at all times and a call to roundtable discussion should 
be carried out or emphasis that can be credited with addressing the key issues at the centre of the conflict. 
 
Implement Peace Agreements: As a matter of fact ECOWAS confronted many challenges and was unable to 
fully warrant the implementation of peace agreements. It has successfully averted a full escalation of the 
conflict on several occasions and made progress in the implementation of certain sensitive aspects of the peace 
agreements. 
 
Legalize intervention in conflict zones: ECOWAS and the AU successfully resolve conflicts through the 
legalization of the various protocols, even in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. Under the supervision of ECOWAS and 
the AU, different parties to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire signed several peace agreements but most of the 
agreements could not be implemented as there were no enforcement mechanisms to make the belligerents 
respect the provisions.  
 
Timely Interventions: The organisations of ECOWAS and the AU leaders played their role in consultations 
with Gbagbo and the president-elect, Alassane Ouattara to prevent an outright civil war which would have had 
ethnic connotations. The AU’s position in resolving the conflict was closely aligned with that of ECOWAS and 
the UN, particularly in their public endorsement of Ouattara as president in the aftermath of the run-off and 
amid the violence that engulfed the country after the 2010 polls. 
 
Reject the Use of Force: Uganda and South Africa were vocal about its rejection of the use of force, is one of 
the leading nations involved in the mediation efforts, maintained that the option of creating a power-sharing 
government should be pursued. In the face of Gbagbo’s regional and global isolation, the divergent views of 
individual members of ECOWAS and the AU member states showed that he had support on the continent, which 
was one of the factors that enabled him to hang on to power for a long time. 
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Common positions: In applying the different mechanisms in place to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, 
members of both ECOWAS and the AU need to ensure that they take common positions in relation to leaders 
who cling to power through unconstitutional means. This study further concludes with a series of 
recommendations for the Southern Africa peace-building procedure, aimed at supporting and informing the 
advancement of South Africa’s civilian capacity mechanisms. The key recommendations as lessons for the 
Southern Africa organisation and South Africa are outlined as below: It is recommended that a wider 
discussions should be held among policymakers on the roles and functions of South Africa’s new development 
agency, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA); It recommends that South Africa’s 
engagements should be preceded by the development of a longer-term strategy, which should take into 
consideration current debates and discussions around civilian capacities in mediating peace internationally.  
 
South Africa should use its expertise and experience to complement and enhance the various engagements of 
multilateral institutions to promote safety and stability. The government, particularly in its diplomatic 
relations, defence, trade and coordination of actors and institutions – should further refine the country’s 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.The value of this recommendation 
is in what it can add to existing knowledge on the impact of civilian capacities in conflict resolution and 
prevention in South Africa (drawing on the background of the xenophobic attack on fellow but foreign Africans 
in the Republic), and around the world. Its purpose is to add to the development of SADPA and support South 
Africa to improve its civilian capacity mechanisms in conflict prevention, peace-building, peace-making and 
sustain socio-economic development, and peaceful coexistence among people, because South is Africa’s 
window to the world in terms of foreign direct investment. 
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